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ABSTRACT 
The rapid growth of capabilities and various services provided by smartphones 
transformed this device to a repository of private data and important resources and 
consequently an attractive target for attackers.  Among the leaders in the world of 
smartphones, Android is a novel platform with rapidly growing market share.  Number of 
Android users grows tremendously and preliminary study has shown that there are a number 
of the users that have little or no knowledge about the security of android based platforms. 
This is a serious issue because Android has delegated security decisions to the users 
themselves and furthermore there is no effective auditing on application development in 
android market.  This research focuses on the most important attacks in Android which are 
concerned with the applications try to acquire excessive privileges by user approval, 
colluding together or even misusing other applications.  The detection mechanisms proposed 
in this study addressed the mentioned attacks by proposing a method for detecting 
applications which are able to collude together to acquire excessive privileges and also a 
method to improve the precision of the existing mechanism for detecting applications 
vulnerable to be misused by privilege escalation attack. Excessive privileges are detected 
primarily by checking the application ability to share their permissions and then by 
comparing the acquired permissions against a set of predefined rules.  Proposed mechanisms 
are integrated and implemented in form of an Android application by using Java (Android) 
language.  The functionality of the implemented application is tested and validated by 
applying it on a series of applications downloaded from “Google play” and comparing the 
results with the existing methods.  Experiments showed that the mechanism is able to detect 
applications vulnerable to privilege escalation attack accurately and also applications which 
are able to collude to obtain excessive permissions and were ignored by the existing 
methods. 
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ABSTRAK 
Pertumbuhan pesat keupayaan dan perkhidmatan yang disediakan untuk telefon 
pintar menjadikan peralatan ini sebagai satu  alat simpanan data peribadi dan sensitif.  Ini 
sebaliknya telah membuatkan peralatan ini sebagai sasaran untuk penyerang.  Pada masa 
kini, Android merupakan platform yang amat popular  dalam pasaran yang berkembang 
pesat. Bilangan pengguna Android meningkat dengan pesat dan kajian awal telah 
menunjukkan bahawa terdapat beberapa bilangan pengguna mempunyai pengetahuan sedikit 
atau tiada langsung mengenai keselamatan platform berasaskan android.  Ini merupakan satu 
isu yang serius kerana Android telah menyerahkan hal keselamatan telefon pintar kepada 
pengguna sendiri.  Hal ini ditambahkan lagi apabila tiada audit yang berkesan untuk  
memperlihatkan pembangunan aplikasi dalam pasaran android.  Sehubungan itu, kajian ini 
memfokuskan pada serangan yang serius dalam Android iaitu menitikberatkan aplikasi-
aplikasi yang cuba memperolehi keistimewaan yang berlebihan dari keizinan pengguna, atau 
bersekutu sesama serta menyalahgunakan aplikasi lain.  Mekanisma yang dicadangkan 
memperkenalkan metod untuk mengesan aplikasi di mana ia mampu untuk mengesan 
aplikasi yang ingin mendapat keistimewaan yang berlebihan dari sepatutnya dan juga metod 
yang akan meningkatkan ketepatan mekanisma sedia ada untuk aplikasi penegesanan 
kelemahan dari disalah guna untuk serangan peningkatan keistimewaan.  Ini dilaksanakan 
dengan mengesan dengan menyemak kebolehkongsian keizinan dan membandingkan 
keizinan yang diperolehi terhadap satu set peraturan-peraturan yang telah ditetapkan.  
Mekanisma yang dicadangkan adalah bersepadu dan dilaksanakan dalam bentuk  aplikasi 
android dengan menggunakan bahasa pengaturcaraan Java (Android).  Fungsi apliksai yang 
dilaksanakan telah diuji dan disahkan  dengan menjalankan pegujian semakan terhadap siri-
siri aplikasi yang dimuat turun dari “Google Play” dan membandingkan keputusan yang 
terhasil  dengan keputusan ujian metod yang sedia ada.  Keputusan menunjukkan mekanisma 
cadangan berjaya mengesan dengan tepat aplikasi yang mempunyai kelemahan terhadap 
serangan peningkatan keistimewaan. Tambahan metod yang dicadang juga dapat mengesan 
aplikasi yang kebolehan untuk berpakat bagi mendapat kelebihan kebenaran, yang mana 
pada asalnya telah terlepas pandangan oleh method yang sedia ada. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
The rapid growth of capabilities and services that associated with 
smartphones has motivated enterprise to investigate toward these new generation 
platforms.  Portability of traditional smart phone is integrated with the computational 
power of personal computers and the result is the everywhere and every time services 
such as mobile-health, mobile-banking, mobile-shopping, and social network 
services.  With the tremendous growth in using smartphones, the security risk and 
attacks changed to a great concern [1, 2], the portability features of these devices 
make them the user’s closest assistant even more than a PC or notebook, so the 
amount of data, and the level of importance of this data make them an attractive 
target for attackers while a great threat to customers [3]. 
Despite such advancement in application and services smartphones offer, the 
privacy of user sensitive data to third-party application is still a point of concern.  
Applications are granted privileges legitimately for accessing to user sensitive 
information, but they may use the user data in an improper way.  Coming to a 
reasonable trade-off between functionality of running third-party application and 
maintaining user privacy is a significant challenge in smartphones platforms [4].  For 
instance, if a user install an application that have access to user’s location 
information, he/she is not sure whether the data is being used in a proper way or the 
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application sends it to remote server for advertising reasons or other malicious 
purpose.  In other words, users blindly trust that application and suppose that the 
application use them properly.  Unfortunately recent researches [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] showed 
that currently there are various application with different malicious purpose uploaded 
in market, and users are attracted by their splendid advertisement.  These 
applications have been developed with malicious purpose such as leaking user 
sensitive information [9].   
Google Android is a novel smartphone platform with rapidly growing market 
share [10] and also could possess the first rank in mass-production of application 
development [3].  According to a recent report released by mobile security firm 
Lookout, the Android Market is growing at three times the rate of Apple’s App store 
[11].  Dissimilar to Apple, Google has no mechanism in auditing application 
published in market.  And from time to time, it may need to remove malicious 
application from the market after they are proved to contain malware [11].  
Moreover, since everyone who has registered as Android developer has permission 
to upload his/her application to Android market, it changed to a potential place for 
attackers to get to their malicious intentions [12]. 
In such situation security concerns grows with the same rate of increasing 
Android applications and users, therefore, the need of achieving a higher level of 
security in Android platform has been arisen more than ever. 
 
1.2 Problem Background 
In brief, Android is basically a privilege-separated operating system [13, 11].  
Android places each application in its own Dalvik virtual machine and they run with 
a unique system identity.  In this way all applications are isolated from each other 
and from the system.  In normal state, since applications run in separated virtual 
machine and with respect to specific Android security mechanism, they have no way 
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to negatively affect other applications, damage operating system, or cause leaking 
sensitive information stored on the phone [14].  While access of applications to each 
other components is controlled through Android specific security mechanism, 
granting Android built-in permissions to new installed applications and giving access 
to Android components takes place based on user discretion.  To be able to do any 
actions, applications should ask for any required permissions at install time to be 
approved by user.   
However, Android integrates many security mechanisms along with the 
important issue that the Android kernel is developed based on Linux which has a 
robust security infrastructure, yet the occurrence of attacks reveals that Android’s 
permission framework has some vulnerability which are targeted by attackers.  The 
most common attacks are caused by misusing of critical permissions that are 
approved by users and also application-level privilege escalation [12].  The major 
responsibility of maintaining the security of the device in right level is left to end-
user and most of them are unaware of critical security issues that not respecting 
them may cause leaking out the user sensitive information or misusing of the 
device.   
Requesting excessive permissions by an application and granting them by 
an unaware user violates the principle of “least privilege” and gives the malicious 
application the opportunity of taking advantages of extra privileges that are not 
needed for its normal functionality.  Request for acquiring excessive permissions 
by applications is highly probable since Android has no effective audit on 
application developers; moreover, the majority of users do not have the knowledge 
of discerning the minimum necessary permissions needed by an App from extra 
permissions it may request.  So this has become the main concern in the recent 
Android attacks.  For example by installing every application without enough 
precision, a door for malware and Trojans such as unauthorized sending of  text 
messages [15], malicious game updates [16], or location tracking and leaking of 
sensitive data in the background of running games can be opened [17]. 
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Recent research showed that a malicious application can exploit an 
unprotected privileged application or seizes more permission to do harmful actions, 
i.e., a non-privileged caller with few permissions is not bounded to access component 
of an application with more privileges [18, 11].  Such attacks are known as privilege 
escalation attacks.  In case of success of attack, a malicious application seizes more 
permission indirectly and through another application.  Therefore an unprivileged 
application can perform its malicious intentions by employ other applications which 
have the supposed permissions.  The attacks reported so far range from unauthorized 
phone calls [19] and text message sending [18] to illegal downloads of malicious 
files [20] and context-aware voice recording [21, 22].  Most attacks of this kind target 
privileged applications with vulnerable interface [23, 24].  However it is most seen that 
a group of malicious applications can collude and gain more permissions by 
accumulating their privilege.  This attack is referred to as collusion attack [21].  In this 
way malicious applications benefit from a set of permissions which empowers them to 
perform malicious actions.  Below are some instances of probable malicious actions 
[25]: 
(i) Sending SMS/MMS to contact or anonymous.  This kind of attack causes 
overcharging the user. 
(ii) Depleting the phone battery by performing unnecessary process to 
interrupt normal services. 
(iii) Communicating to charged site or pay per-minute telephone number and 
overcharge the user. 
(iv) Installing malware code such as worms and viruses and disturbing the 
normal function of the device and spreading them to other devices through 
Bluetooth or other possible ways.   
(v) Illegally accessing to user sensitive information, altering, or deleting them.   
(vi) Leaking the user personal information out for malicious purpose. 
In order to detecting and defeating these attacks and mitigate the consequent 
malicious actions, several researches have been conducted which are mostly propose 
some modification to Android OS to mitigate the shortcomings of the system.  Most 
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proposed solutions need modifications to Android’s middleware, the main 
middleware components such as the application installer, the reference monitor, the 
permission database, and the Dalvik virtual machine.  While some others focus on 
proposing detection mechanisms to prevent suspicious and vulnerable applications 
from installing or make Android users aware of these threats in order to help them 
make reasonable decisions about granting critical permissions to applications which 
is an important preventing mechanism due to the significant role of the users in 
maintaining security in Android. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Critical privileges acquired by applications through user approval, sharing 
permissions or using unprotected applications may cause serious attacks to users’ 
privacy and sensitive information in Android devices. Therefore, a detecting system 
which addresses these attacks is necessary to make users aware of the possibility of 
such attacks in order to protect their information and privacy from malicious 
applications.  
1.4 Objectives of the Project 
The objectives of this project are listed as follows: 
 
(i) To identify attacks result from applications with critical privileges and 
also the existing detection mechanism in Android smartphones. 
(ii) To enhance the capabilities of existing detection mechanisms by 
designing and implementing an application for detecting applications that 
are potentially capable of conducting malicious activities or even are 
vulnerable to be misused by malicious applications.   
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(iii) To test and validate the functionality of implemented application in terms 
of enhancement in detection mechanism by applying it on a set of 
applications downloaded from the official Android market called “Google 
Play”. 
1.5 Scope of  the Project 
This research investigates the shortcomings in Android permission system 
and attacks result from that in order to develop a useful application to detect 
applications that are potentially capable of conducting malicious activities solely or 
by colluding and also applications that are vulnerable to be misused by malicious 
applications.  The scope of this study is defined as follows: 
(i) Attacks results from applications with excessive privileges are 
considered; attacks result from granting extra permissions to a single 
application or a group of application that are capable of colluding 
together and sharing their privileges, and attacks result from unprotected 
components in applications. 
(ii) The programming language used for developing the proposed application 
is Java(Android). 
(iii) The application is applied on the number of applications obtained from 
“Google Play” in order to test and validate. 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
The outcome of this project is improving the security level in Android phones 
by increasing the user awareness of probable attacks and helping them making 
reasonable decisions regarding granting permissions to the applications, due to the 
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fact that users have the most significant role in securing Android phones and 
unfortunately most of them know little about security. 
1.7 Organization of the Report 
This study is divided into six chapters.  Chapter 1 describes briefly about the 
overview of the project and understanding of the project’s problem background.  It 
also includes the project’s scope, purpose of this research and objectives.  Chapter 2 
discusses about Android architecture, Android security mechanisms, Android 
application package and related works of this study. The methodology of this 
research is explained in detail in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 contains explanations of design and implementation of this study.  
Chapter 5 explains results of this research based on applying the implemented 
application on a series of applications downloaded from “Google play” and 
comparing the results with the existing methods.  Finally, Chapter 6 reviews and 
summarizes the whole project findings and suggests some recommendations. 
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